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The presented equity research report has the objective to determine the fair value of the Italian luxury 
performance car manufacturer Ferrari N.V. To achieve this, an in-depth analysis of the company’s 
business and industry in which it operates is conducted.  Subsequently, a DCF valuation is performed 
based on the assumptions made to achieve the forecasted financials. The result is a share price of €200.05 
as of January 2 2021, which represents an upside of 36% compared to the current price of €149.55 and 
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Ferrari is an Italian luxury sports car manufacturer. The Ferrari 
brand symbolizes exclusivity, innovation, state-of-the-art sporting 
performance, and engineering heritage. In 2018 Ferrari shipped 
9251 cars with an average revenue per car of  €274 thousand. 
Ferrari plans to introduce 15 new models in the 2019-2022 period 
and is investing heavily in the hybridization of its product range. 
Ferrari competes with both large automotive groups, as well as 
small producers. Ferrari benefits from its powerful brand, Formula 
One, consumer loyalty and unique driving experience to remain a 
leader in its segment.  
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Automotive industry in a business 
model revolution 
How Ferrari is adapting to current industry trends 
  
§ Industry: The luxury automotive industry is at a 
turning point. Consumer preferences, broader industry 
trends and regulatory requirements direct car manufacturers 
to continuously explore and develop new technologies. 
Furthermore, it compels OEMs to pursue new markets such 
as hybrid and electric mobility. These contingencies force 
OEMs to radically change the product mix, placing stress in 
costs mostly related with R&D and PP&E. 
§ Ferrari: Significant changes are expected to occur 
in Ferrari’s businesses. Not only is it debuting new models 
at an unprecedented rate, but it is also entering in new 
segments such as SUVs and hybrids, which significantly 
alter the product mix. This is forcing the company to deploy 
considerable resources, which puts pressure on operating 
margins. Also, engine sales to Maserati are weakening and 
expected to cease in 2021. As for branding activities, half of 
the licensing agreements are expected to be terminated in 
an attempt to position Ferrari’s licensing and retail activities 
in the same luxury level as its cars.  
Recommendation: BUY 
Vs Previous Recommendation - 
Price Target FY20: 200.05 € 
Vs Previous Price Target - 
Price (as of 3-Jan-20) 149.55 € 
Thomson Reuters 
  
52-week range (€) 84.08-156.35 
Market Cap (€m) 28,681.29 
Outstanding Shares (m) 185.87 
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(Values in € millions) 2018 2019E 2020F 
Revenues 3,420 3,672 4,040 
EBIT 827 792 721 
Net Profit 783 641 593 
Gross margin 58.8% 58.8% 57.3% 
PP&E 851 1,161 1,277 
Net Financial Assets (1,207) (1,220) (1,271) 
EPS 4.17 3.45 3.21 
P/E 21.26x 43.29x 62.41x 
ROIC 52.1% 31.7% 27.7% 
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Ferrari’s luxury car offering is set to become the most complete ever thanks to the 
unprecedented new model introductions, including the first of many hybrid and 
SUV models. Nova Research Team expects that over the next five-year period, 
hybrid (Chart 1) and SUV models will make most of Ferrari’s units sold, which are 
expected to grow by 101% in the 2018-2025 period (Chart 2). We are confident 
that the increase in units is demand-driven and does not compromise the 
company’s low volume strategy and exclusivity. The increase in volume is 
accompanied by a general increase in price, mostly driven by the premium charged 
in hybrid models, which are expected to represent 83% of the units sold by 2025. 
However, hybrid models are expected to carry lower margins.  
V6 and V8 engine sales to Maserati are weakening, and are expected to cease in 
2020 and 2021, respectively. As for branding activities, half of the licensing 
agreements are expected to be terminated in an attempt to position Ferrari’s 
licensing and retail activities in the same luxury level as its cars.  
From fiscal 2019 to 2025, Ferrari’s core business free cash flows are expected to 
vary significantly not only due to the effects on revenues and operating margins 
mentioned above but also due to the significant capital expenditures required by 
the extensive hybridization of the product offering. For this reason, an annuity 
period was included in the valuation, in which Ferrari’s cash flows are expected to 
evolve more consistently, before reaching the terminal value (Chart 3). 
In the short-term, Ferrari will disburse vast sums of capital in renovating its fleet, 
factories, and technology. Hence, its RONIC will be negative and below ROIC. 
From 2022 to 2025, RONIC becomes positive, primarily driven by cash flows from 
cars and spare parts. However, there is an unfavorable product mix as the years 
go by related to a rise in manufacturer costs of hybrid cars, contributing towards a 
decline in RONIC. From 2026 onwards, RONIC will stabilize (Chart 4). In 
perpetuity, Nova Research Team expects RONIC to equal WACC. Ferrari is not 
likely to hold its competitive advantages, which are mainly propelled by its unique 
driver experience that is threatened by technologies such as autonomous vehicles. 
Discounting the forecasted core business free cash flows back at a WACC of 
4.63% and adding the non-core business and net financial assets at book value, 
we arrive at an equity value of €37 billion at the end of 2020 (Chart 5). Our €200.05 
target price is derived via a DCF analysis, using a 4.84% cost of equity, 1.36% pre-
tax cost of debt and 2.5% terminal value growth.  
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Chart 3: 
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The Luxury Automotive Industry 
While Ferrari is an automotive manufacturer, it is essential for one to grasp the 
difference between the luxury automotive industry, where Ferrari operates, and the 
broader luxury industry. The luxury car industry is similar to other luxury goods in 
many aspects, such as in quality, rarity, exclusivity, high degree of non-functional 
associations, and rarity. All in all, it contributes to higher pricing when compared to 
mass-market goods.  
Ferrari has followed close growth patterns with the broader luxury market (Chart 
6). Historically, luxury OEM’s1 have proven resilient against global macroeconomic 
downturns even though they are usually affected by them since, factors such as 
economic confidence, expectations regarding future income streams, and social 
acceptability on luxury goods impact their sales. In moments of economic 
stagnation and recessions, however, luxury OEMs managed to minimize impact 
and reverse it quickly (Chart 7)  as a result of the increase of new product launches, 
which can have a disproportionate impact on sales of luxury goods in light of the 
discretionary nature of consumer spending in this market. 
Sales in the luxury performance car market are strongly driven by new product 
launches, unlike what happens in other segments of the broader luxury market. 
Therefore, the market share of luxury producers fluctuates over time, reflecting the 
timing of product launches. In such an emotional investment, the excitement of 
novelty and exclusivity of owning a luxury car is capable of producing and capturing 
its own demand from clients.         
Competition 
Competition in the luxury performance car market is clustered in a reasonably 
small number of manufacturers, which include both large automotive companies 
that own luxury brands such as BMW and Volkswagen, as well as smaller 
producers exclusively focused on luxury cars, such as Ferrari and McLaren.  
The luxury performance car market consists of two segments: sports and GT2 cars. 
Recently, the market shifted somewhat by placing more emphasis on GT cars and 
the lower-priced range of the sports car market, with larger automotive groups 
expanding their offering of premium cars to enter the luxury car market3. Brand 
strength and the appeal of the products in terms of performance, novelty, styling, 
and innovation as well as on the manufacturer’s ability to renew its product 
 
1 Original Equipment Manufacturer 
2 Gran Turismo 
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Source: Bloomberg 
Note: Amundi S&P Global Luxury UCITS ETF seeks to replicate the 
evolution of the S&P Global Luxury index. This ETF enables investors 
to benefit from an exposure to around 80 major luxury-related 
securities in the world. The fund’s top holdings include LVMH, Cie 
Financiere Richemont, Kering, Daimler, Estee Lauder, Pernord 
Ricard, Diageo, Nike, Shiseido and Hermés.  
Chart 6: 
Share price Ferrari versus Amundi S&P Global 































Source: Nova Research Team 
Note: Players are divided into tiers based on the similarities with 
Ferrari in terms of market positioning and strategy 
Chart 8: 
Luxury performance car market players 
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Source: Nova Research Team 
Note: Players are divided into tiers based on the similarities with 
Ferrari in terms of market positioning and strategy 
Chart 9: 
Luxury performance car market players 
units sold 2018 (thousands) 
offerings regularly to continue to stimulate customer demand are some of the main 
drivers for competition in the luxury car market.  
Larger automotive groups that own luxury car manufacturers have access to more 
financial resources than small luxury car producers hence, having more flexibility 
in planning for product launches and capital spending over time. Price and total 
cost of ownership drive competition among similarly positioned luxury performance 
car producers. For the sports cars, Ferrari’s main competitors are Lamborghini, 
McLaren, Ford, Honda, Porsche, Mercedes, Aston Martin, and Audi. Regarding 
the GT models, their primary competitors are Rolls-Royce, Bentley, Aston Martin, 
and Mercedes. Charts 8 and 9 compare important metrics of exclusivity between 
Ferrari and its competitors.  
Trends 
Some trends that are shifting the luxury automotive industry are:  
1) Buyers are getting younger. The automotive industry is characterised by being 
slow to change. Cars take years to design and develop, and the models that are 
now rolling out of factories begun their life a decade ago in the drawing boards. 
With this demographic shift, OEMs must become nimbler and take greater risks to 
remain relevant. The age of a luxury car customer is dependent on the region being 
analysed and is expected to decrease (Chart 10). For example, in the UK, Europe, 
and Japan, a typical supercar buyer will be around their 50’s while in California, it 
falls to around 35. In China, this shift is even more felt since a luxury car costumer 
can be as young as 204. 
 2) Growing proportion of female buyers. Ferrari estimates that the female 
segment accounts for less than 5% of its sales. At Aston Martin, the figure is 8%, 
nonetheless higher than it was a decade ago, although still low. Regarding 
McLaren, it estimates its sales to women are around 15% though it thinks the 
proportion of female drivers is much bigger than the statistics reflect5. However, in 
China, the female segment is responsible for 50% of purchases of luxury cars, 
mainly driven by the GT class. The number of wealthy female consumers is 
growing. Aston Martin estimates a potential market composed of 14,000 female 
buyers valued at $30M or more in the US and China alone4. 
 3) Rising SUV and GT markets. SUV’s popularity has been growing worldwide 
(Chart 11). A third of cars sold in Europe are now SUVs6. Some 60% of 
 
4 Financial Times. 2019. “Luxury car makers are battling to cater to the changing needs of the super-rich”. Accessed January 1. 
https://www.ft.com/content/e81102b2-bf2e-11e9-9381-78bab8a70848 
5 To calculate this statistic, companies look to the legal name under the vehicle title, which in many cases has the name of the male. 
6 Financial Times. 2019. “Europe has a problem with its SUV habit”. Accessed January 1. https://www.ft.com/content/2967c9e2-ffc3-11e9-b7bc-
f3fa4e77dd47.  
“There’s a potential for about 
27% of the luxury car market 
to be female” 
Carlee Hardaker 










Source: Bain & Company 
Chart 10: 
Share of global personal luxury goods 













Lamborghini’s sales in the first half of 2019 were SUVs4. Their elevated seats make 
it more comfortable to climb, and it gives drivers a greater sense of confidence, 
which is connected with wider visibility and security feeling due to the car size.  
4) Electric and hybrid vehicles. New regulation regarding greenhouse gas 
emissions imposed worldwide contributed to OEM’s to overweight both their hybrid 
and EV sales (Charts 12 and 13) to avoid heavy fines. These measures place 
tension in car manufacturers since it takes several years or even a decade from 
the moment a car is first conceptualized until it reaches the market.  
Far-reaching changes and huge investments will be required for European nations 
to comply with the Paris deal and cut emissions net zero7 by 2050. More than 1 
million8 electric or plug-in hybrid vehicles are expected to be sold across Europe 
in 2020, which is four times higher than sales in 2018. We are also witnessing a 
shift in China towards adopting environmentally conscious cars. China developed 
an industrial policy known as “Made in China 2025”9, where it plans to become 
global leaders and self-sufficient in the production of electric vehicles10. China 
introduced a preferential vehicle licensing program for consumers to start adopting 
EV cars. In at least six11 Chinese cities, EV buyers can get license plates for free 
without having to wait. These centres account for 70%Error! Bookmark not defined. of 
domestic EV purchases. Moving on to the west, the US is also adopting EV’s, 
currently ranking as the third-largest electric vehicle market with their sales topping 
at 2 million12 in 2018, representing an increase of 70% from 2017. The main factors 
that are driving growth in the US EV’s market are fiscal incentives, infrastructure 
buildout, high occupancy vehicle lane access, and parking incentives12.  
5) Growing number of high net worth individuals. The number of HNWI in the 
world (people with over $1 million in investable assets) is predicted to climb from 
18 million in 2018 to 30 million4 by 2030 (Chart 14), which is likely to alter the profile  
of the supercar customer base. 
While not only buyers are getting younger, but also current luxury consumers are 
becoming more eco-friendly, it contributes towards luxury car manufacturers to 
start adopting and developing hybrid and electric technologies. Ferrari disclosed 
 
7 The Guardian. 2019. “Proposed EU-wide 'climate law' would set net-zero carbon target by 2050”. Accessed January 2. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/29/first-eu-wide-climate-law-to-set-net-zero-carbon-target-by-2050. 
8 Financial Times. 2019. “EU electric car sales to pass 1m next year in industry CO2 drive”. Accessed January 2. https://www.ft.com/content/6aa6117c-
d0b4-11e9-99a4-b5ded7a7fe3f. 
9 South China Morning Post. 2018. “‘Made in China 2025’: world’s biggest auto market wants to be the most powerful maker of electric cars”. Accessed 
January 2. https://www.scmp.com/business/china-business/article/2169698/made-china-2025-worlds-biggest-auto-market-wants-be-most. 
10 Nikkei Asian Review. 2019. “'Made in China 2025' forges ahead with EV dominance in sight”. Accessed January 2.https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/China-
tech/Made-in-China-2025-forges-ahead-with-EV-dominance-in-sight?fbclid=IwAR0UeKFQ_2MwpJHH-GQtDFRz-
.nGafm82XJzY31_HNHsQX_1bQVEjrGRN96Y 
11 Financial Times. 2017. “Subsidies help China sell the most electric cars”. Accessed January 2. https://www.ft.com/content/18afe28e-a1d2-11e7-8d56-
98a09be71849. 
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plans to start employing cleaner energy solutions on their car models in the years 
to come. Nova Research Team has a strong belief that this scenario will materialize 
and will affect the product mix and its implications.  
Since the proportion of female buyers will increase, it will also impact the future 
product mix. This class of buyer prefers SUV’s and GT cars. In the valuation, Nova 
Research Team considers these factors since it increases the impact of the GT 
class in the product offering mainly driven by the introduction of Ferrari’s first SUV 
(Purosangue) and the new V6 category of cars. Lastly, the pool of possible Ferrari 
clients will increase in the future. This growth is driven by the increase of HNWI 
globally and the female market segment that started having their tastes 
incorporated in luxury cars. Even though Ferrari does not intend to satisfy all the 
demand, Nova Research Team confidently presumes, in the future, Ferrari will 
have the right market conditions to increase their supply, as it did historically. 
Hence, it will impact the forecast of future global supply of automobiles, without 
compromising their low volume strategy. 
Company overview 
Ferrari is an Italian luxury sports car manufacturer based in Maranello, Italy. It is 
among the world’s leading luxury brands focused on developing and 
commercializing the world’s most exclusive luxury cars. The Ferrari brand 
epitomises innovation, state-of-the-art sporting performance, engineering heritage, 
and exclusivity. To achieve this, Ferrari pursues a low volume production strategy 
coupled with long delivery waitlists and premium pricing to maintain a reputation 
for exclusivity and scarcity. 
IPO and Spin-off 
On October 2014, FCA13 announced it would separate the Ferrari business from 
the Group. To that end, Ferrari N.V. was established as the new holding company 
of the Ferrari group. Later, there was an initial public offering and listing of the 
common shares of Ferrari N.V. on the New York Stock Exchange under the symbol 
“RACE”. Subsequently, Ferrari was listed on Borsa Italiana (Chart 15).  
Many reasons lead companies to spin-off part of their business. Still, such a 
decision ultimately means the management team believes a conglomerate 
discount is being applied and the sum of each firm separately exceeds the value 
of the firm as a whole. As a stand-alone company, Ferrari gets operational 
independence. Also, under FCA’s wing, Ferrari was being valued at broader 
 




















 Oct 15  Apr 16  Oct 16  Apr 17  Oct 17  Apr 18  Oct 18  Apr 19  Oct 19
 RACE IM Equity  FCA IM Equity
Chart 15: 













automotive industry multiples. These are far lower than luxury industry multiples, 
which share more similarities with Ferrari than most automotive manufacturers. 
Nevertheless, with the separation, Ferrari loses the safety net of FCA’s more 
abundant financial resources, which are of massive importance in planning for 
product launches and capital spending over time. We are not concerned with this 
issue for several reasons. For instance, Ferrari has very high operating margins, 
sustainable demand for its products, strong competitive advantages and a clear 
strategic plan that we believe will allow the company to continue its high growth 
trajectory, all of which will be developed in detail throughout this report.  
Shareholder structure 
(Chart 16) Exor N.V. is Ferrari’s largest shareholder, owning 23.7% of the company 
and is one of Europe’s leading diversified holding companies. It invests in 
companies from different sectors, mainly in Europe and in the United States. Its 
present principal business activity is to purchase, administer, and dispose of equity 
interests in public and private entities. Pierro Ferrari is the son of Enzo Ferrari, the 
company’s founder, and is the owner of 10.1% of Ferrari N.V.’s share capital. 
BlackRock is the world's largest asset manager. It purchased a stake of 5.3% of 
Ferrari. Finally, T. Rowe Price Group, Inc. is an American publicly owned global 
asset management firm and is the fourth largest Ferrari N.V. shareholder. We 
conclude that Ferrari’s principal shareholders pursue long-term investments and 
are mostly concentrated in Europe.  
Shareholders can obtain special voting shares (Chart 17) through the loyalty voting 
structure. Its purpose is to stimulate stability of the company’s shareholder pool 
and reward long-term investors. They may apply to participate in the loyalty voting 
program by registering their common shares in the loyalty share register and 
holding them for three years. Each special voting share entitles the holder to 
exercise one vote at the shareholders meeting. The special voting shares have 
only immaterial economic entitlements and, as a result, don’t impact the company’s 
earnings per share calculation. Besides, special voting shares cannot be sold or 
transferred. If the holder of such shares wishes to liquidate his investment, he must 
de-register his shares to convert them back to common shares3. 
Ferrari gives money back to shareholders in the form of dividends, cash 
distributions (Chart 18), and share buybacks. In May 2019, Ferrari distributed a 
dividend of €1.03 per common share, totaling approximately €194 million14. As for 
the share buybacks, the company has been deploying a share repurchase 
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program since 2018, which involved the repurchase of 2,769,155 shares 
(approximately €150 million)during fiscal 201915. The company already announced 
its intention to continue pursuing this program at least until the first half of 202016.  
Group structure 
Ferrari N.V is an SPV17 created for the separation between FCA and Ferrari. It is 
the owner of Ferrari S.p.A, which owns all of the Group’s subsidiaries, ranging from 
service companies to financial services, operating all over the world. Ferrari N.V is 
the indirect owner of 100% of all subsidiaries except Ferrari International Cars 







Nowadays, Ferrari operates under one reportable business segment, with four 
revenue streams (Chart 19): cars and spare parts; sponsorship, commercial and  
brand; engine and other. Cars and spare parts have historically been the main 
focus of Ferrari’s business, representing 74% of revenues in 2018, followed by 
sponsorship, commercial and brand, which represented 15%. The third most 
significant segment is engines, responsible for 10% of revenue generation, and 
lastly other revenues represented 3%.  
1) Cars and spare parts. Ferrari’s luxury car offering comprises four main pillars: 
Sports range, which favor performance over comfort; GT range, that are 
characterized by more refined interiors with a higher focus on comfort and quality 
of life on-board; Special series, which can be limited in time or volume and are 
based on range models but introduce novel product concepts, and Icona, 
 




16 Ferrari 2019 Buyback program. Accessed January 2. https://corporate.ferrari.com/en/ferrari-nv-completion-second-tranche-disclosed-multi-year-share-
repurchase-program-and-announcement. 
17 Special purpose vehicle 
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Source: Ferrari Annual Report 2018 
Chart 19: 
Revenue streams evolution 
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introduced in late 2018, a unique concept which takes inspiration from the iconic 
cars of Ferrari’s history and reinterprets them in a modern fashion3.  
Historically, sports cars represent the most significant percentage of units sold 
(Chart 20). However, in recent years GT cars have been gaining market share 
within Ferrari’s offering, explained by the changing consumer preferences towards 
more comfortable and practical cars, especially among female consumers.  
In addition to these ranges, Ferrari also produces limited edition hypercars. These 
are often the forerunners of technological innovations for future range models3. 
The company also launches very limited-edition cars (fuori serie), that feature a 
completely unique design and specifications. Ferrari from time to time also 
produces one-off models. While based on current range models, these cars reflect 
the exact exterior and interior design specifications requested by the clients and 
are produced as a single, unique car3. Finally, the company also manufactures and 
sells track cars, for use only in racetracks. 
Limited edition cars are a crucial part of Ferrari’s business as they appeal to the 
most elite clients and are an essential weapon in maintaining client relationships. 
Ferrari even takes this quest for the exclusive to the extra level with its one-off 
models and its tailor-made program. Any average millionaire or billionaire can buy 
a Ferrari, but only a select group gets the privilege of purchasing a fully customized 
one. However, Ferrari is not the only player to offer limited edition supercars and 
personalization services. Luxury automotive peers Lamborghini, Rolls Royce, 
Bentley, and Aston Martin also have a similar offering. As for one of a kind vehicles, 
Ferrari is a pioneer in this segment and the manufacturer with the most well-
developed program, followed by Rolls-Royce and Aston Martin (Table 1).  
2) Sponsorship, Commercial and Brand (Chart 21). The company’s main 
marketing initiative is the participation in the Formula 1 World Championship with 
its team, Scuderia Ferrari. The participation in this competition attracts significant 
sponsorships. Also, Scuderia Ferrari brings in revenue thanks to the cash prizes 
associated with the participation in competitions. Other brand development 
activities include licensing contracts with selected partners, retail activities through 
a chain of franchised or directly managed stores, licensed theme parks, and the 
development of a line of apparel and accessories sold exclusively in monobrand 
stores and on Ferrari’s website3.  
Ferrari faces a different set of competitors in F1 than in its road car business. To 
this day, Ferrari has the most profitable sponsorship deals (Chart 22), even though 
it has not won a title since 2008. As for commercial revenues, Ferrari is also the 
Source: Ferrari Annual Report 2018 
Chart 20: 
Ferrari car shipments breakdown 
(2016-2018) 
Source: Ferrari Annual Report 2018, Nova Research team 
Chart 21: 
Sponsorship, commercial and brand 
(€ million, 2016-2018) 
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Table 1: 
Luxury car manufacturers product and 
services offering  
 
 








highest paid, primarily thanks to the long-standing team payment of around €60 
million, attributed only to Ferrari.  
As for licensing contracts and retail activities, other luxury car manufacturers 
besides Ferrari are no strangers to such endeavors. Lamborghini, Bentley, and 
Aston Martin also offer a wide range of products in the same categories as Ferrari. 
Regarding theme parks, Ferrari is a pioneer. No other car manufacturer, luxury or 
not, has a dedicated flagship theme park.  
3) Engines. This segment captures the supply of engines to Maserati and the 
rental of engines to Formula 1 race teams, other than Scuderia Ferrari. Ferrari has 
a multi-year arrangement with Maserati to provide V6 and V8 engines up to 2020 
and 2021, respectively. As for F1, Ferrari currently rents engines to two teams. 
Supplying engines to other car manufacturers is not a common practice among 
luxury car manufacturers. Ferrari is currently the only one pursuing this business 
opportunity. Regarding the rental of engines to F1 teams, its main competitors are 
Honda, Mercedes, and Renault, which share the supply of engines to F1’s top 10 
teams (Chart 23).  
4) Other. Primarily includes the operations of Ferrari financial services and from 
the management of the Mugello racetrack. The Mugello racing circuit, is rented by 
Ferrari to racing events organizers. As for its financial services, Ferrari offers retail 
client financing for the purchase of cars and dealer financing through Ferrari 
Financial Services (“FFS”). Having a financial services unit is a common practice 
under auto manufacturers.   
Strategy  
Ferrari plans to introduce 15 new models in the 2019-2022 period3, which is 
unprecedented for Ferrari over a similar period. In the GT range, the company is 
developing its first luxury SUV, the Purosangue, and a new line of cars powered 
by V6 engines3.  
While Ferrari is broadening its product portfolio, we expect that sports cars will 
continue to be Ferrari’s main business, but that GT cars will continuously capture 
more and more demand, as observed in the broader industry (Chart 24), especially 
with the introduction of the SUV. While such a high number of new launches in the 
upcoming years implies a higher production level, we believe Ferrari will not 
compromise its low-volume strategy.  
As for limited edition cars, sales in this segment are expected to increase as the 
ultra-wealthy value the most exclusive products and are willing to spend more 
money on a unique item. 
A product range more 
complete than even before… 
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Source: Ferrari Annual Report 2018 
Coupled with the introduction of a broad range of new models, Ferrari intends to 
introduce new models more frequently. Currently, the average production lifecycle 
for sport and GT models is from 4 to 5 years and less for special series. While we 
expect this decision to increase revenues, it will also increase R&D costs, since 
developing more models implies deploying far more development resources. 
In addition, car prices are expected to continue to rise, both to compensate for 
costs of added technology such as expensive hybrid systems, but also because 
the affluence of Ferrari’s customer base keeps on growing. 
To be consistent with consumer preferences and regulatory requirements 
regarding emissions, Ferrari has announced it will gradually but rapidly expand the 
use of hybrid technology in its road cars. The CEO plans to have hybridization 
across at least 60% of Ferrari's range cars by 202218, including a 100% hybrid 
sports car range by 202119. Considering the already debuted and expected models 
for the next five years, we believe that the CEO’s plans are optimistic, and will most 
likely fall short. Nevertheless, we expect a non-material impact on revenues 
assuming that upcoming combustion engine vehicles will still be sought-after by 
Ferrari clients and that demand will not be an issue. Still, we do expect the 
percentage of hybrid models to increase with time, which will likely carry lower 
margins than current models despite the higher retail price, due to the higher cost 
of manufacturing, especially in the short-term.   
The company is deploying considerable resources for the development of hybrid 
powertrains, as made clear by the company’s CAPEX evolution (Charts 25 and 
26), particularly in 2018. As for a full electric battery, Mr. Camilleri, the CEO, said 
it should arrive between 2025 and 203019, with the precise date depending on the 
speed of technological advances. We do not expect Ferrari to debut a fully electric 
vehicle before 2030.  
As for branding activities, the CEO’s plans for the company include terminating half 
of the licensing agreements that do not share the brand’s values20. Besides, he 
plans to enhance the brand through new apparel and accessory collections, 
entertainment offers, luxury products and services for clients. They include an 
agreement with Italian fashion house Giorgio Armani, the opening of a restaurant 
with star chef Massimo Bottura and a theme park in Spain. We believe that this 
strategy has the main objective of positioning Ferrari’s licensing and retail activities 
 
18 Financial Times. 2018. “Ferrari unveils ‘ambitious’ plan to secure future of brand”. Accessed January 2. https://www.ft.com/content/b457a7f4-bb34-11e8-
8274-55b72926558f. 
19 The Wall Street Journal. 2019. “Ferrari CEO Races to Build Company’s Brand”. Accessed January 2. https://www.wsj.com/articles/ferrari-ceo-races-to-
build-companys-brand-11573300801. 
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Source: Ferrari Annual Report 2018 
Chart 26: 
Expensed R&D and CAPEX 
(€ million, 2013-2018) 
 
 








in the same luxury level as its cars, which is currently not the case. We expect this 
will have a positive impact on Ferrari’s revenues in this segment. 
Competitive advantages 
1) Brand value. Ferrari was considered the world’s most powerful brand in 2018 
by Brand Finance21. This is the result Ferrari’s innovation, state-of-the-art sporting 
performance, engineering heritage, and exclusivity. Over the years, the company 
has capitalized the power of the Prancing Horse in other endeavors. It has been 
selectively expanding its brand presence in diverse lifestyle categories consistent 
with its image. Which in return enriches the brand experience of its loyal clients 
and Ferrari enthusiasts. 
2) Formula 1. Ferrari’s name, history and image are closely associated with its 
Formula 1 racing team, Scuderia Ferrari, the most successful team in F1 history. 
From the inaugural year of F1 in 1950 through the present, Scuderia Ferrari has 
won 235 Grand Prix races, 16 Constructor World titles, and 15 Drivers’ World 
titles22. Although Ferrari’s most recent F1 world title was in 2008, it is still the most 
valuable competing team (Chart 27). Its participation in F1 is critical to the brand 
among enthusiasts, customers, and the general public. Ferrari’s racing origins are 
at the core of the company’s excellence, innovation, and unique style. Developing 
race cars is an essential source of technological innovation that is later deployed 
on Ferrari’s road cars. 
3) Loyalty. When clients purchase a Ferrari, they are invited to become part of an 
select group. They can participate in a full calendar of events which foster their 
loyalty to the brand. Ferrari has been exceptional is nurturing a relationship with its 
current clients. In 2018, more than 65%Error! Bookmark not defined. of the 
company’s new cars were sold to Ferrari owners, while 41% of clients own more 
than one Ferrari3. 
Another promoter of loyalty is Ferrari’s resilience in the value of their cars after a 
period of ownership. It significantly exceeds that of any other brand in the luxury 
car segment22.  This is a key competitive advantage since a higher residual value 
lowers the cost to switch to a new model, which promotes repeated purchases. 
4) Driving emotions. As Enrico Galliera explained23, Ferrari does not manufacture 
the fastest or most powerful cars in the market. However, its balance of power and 
drivability to a unique driving experience. At Ferrari they call it “emotion to drive”. 
 
21 Brand Finance. 2018. “Ferrari – The World’s Most Powerful Brand”. Accessed January 2. https://brandfinance.com/news/ferrari--the-worlds-most-powerful-
brand/. 
22 Ferrari Sustainability Report 2018. Accessed January 2. https://corporate.ferrari.com/en/2018-sustainability-report. 
23 Arabian Business. 2016. “Why Ferrari is still the world's most wanted sports car”. Accessed January 2. https://www.arabianbusiness.com/why-ferrari-is-
still-world-s-most-wanted-sports-car-635624.html. 
“If you look in the market and 
you ask, is Ferrari the fastest 
car? The answer is no. If you 
ask me if Ferrari is the car 
with the highest horsepower, 
the answer is no. Is it 
relevant? We don’t believe 
so.”  
Enrico Galliera 
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Source: Forbes 
Note: All figures are Forbes estimates based on financial 
documents, reports and interviews with industry experts  
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Chart 28: 
Inter-connected cars are on the rise 
(billion units) 
What differs Ferrari from other luxury sports car manufacturers is the passion, the 
feeling that collectors and enthusiasts have for this iconic brand. 
Risks 
After a thorough analysis, we identified the following risks affecting the broader 
automotive industry and solely Ferrari as worthy of addressing in this report:  
1) Gasoline prices. This is something we believe will not affect Ferrari since HNWI 
do not take into consideration this variable before buying a luxury car.  
2) Autonomous driving. As previously mentioned, Ferrari has no plans to 
manufacture self-driving cars. However, historically it has already incorporated 
certain autonomous driving technologies and it plans to continue to do so in 
response to regulatory developments and customer preferences.  
For years now, automakers have developed their strategies based on the idea that 
autonomous vehicles’ reality would soon strike the market. OEMs have invested 
billions24 of dollars in designing cars for CASE25 mobility. Currently, connected cars 
are already omnipresent (Chart 28), and EVs are gaining ground among auto 
buyers. Nonetheless, autonomous and shared vehicles are still a futuristic bet for 
which experts forecast a rapid and widespread adoption25 once commercialized.  
Five years ago, analysts forecasted self-driving cars would capture approximately 
80% market share by 203524. More recently, experts acknowledged that it could 
take decades before AV’s are seen on roads24. Furthermore, they may never be 
able to drive without human assistance in challenging conditions such as bad 
weather, crowded or construction areas24.  
Nova Research Team’s view on this risk is that the scenario of one day having 
autonomous cars is very far in the distance, and according to experts it might not 
become a reality. Moreover, there is a growing recognition that getting the self-
driving algorithms right is merely an entry ticket for the much bigger challenge of 
commercialization, which will require government approval, public trust, brand 
marketing, and the ability to manufacture at large scale26. Therefore, we believe 
that in the next decade this risk should not impact Ferrari. However, in perpetuity, 
it can destroy its competitive advantages since if cars are no longer driven by 
humans (Chart 29), Ferrari loses its ability of conveying a unique driving 
experience.     
 
24 PwC. 2019. “Automotive trends 2019”. Accessed January 2. https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/ceo-survey/2019/Theme-assets/reports/automotive-trends-
report.pdf. 
25 Connected, Autonomous, Shared and Electrified 












2018 2025 2030 2040
Non-AV for mobility use Non-AV for private use
AV for mobility service AV for private use
Source: McKinsey & Company 
Chart 29: 
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3) Stand-alone position of Ferrari in the luxury automotive industry. Ferrari 
competes with both international stand-alone luxury manufacturers and mass-
market automakers that own and operate well-known brands of high-quality 
supercars (Figure 2). The latter may have greater financial resources and 
bargaining power with suppliers.  
Currently, the automotive industry is hot in M&A activity which can be interpreted 
as the blueprint firms carry out to face rising costs related with trends in the 
industry. Peugeot’s CEO points out for an increasingly urged industry consolidation 
as a way to meet the vast investment expenses involved in developing new 
technologies to meet both emission targets and client’s higher demands27. In light 
of future demands, Ferrari might burden a competitive disadvantage and in an 
extreme case partner up again with a larger automotive group. Developing and 
applying new automotive technologies is costly and may become even more so in 
the future as technology advances and competition in the industry increases3.  
4) SUV market entrance for Ferrari is planned to occur in 2022. Competitors 
have already introduced their models (Chart 30) and established themselves in the 
market. Even though there is an increasing tendency for selling SUV’s, new 
environmental regulations and eco-clients might annihilate most of SUV’s sales in 
the near future. SUV’s have contributed to rising carbon emissions6. In addition, it 
consumes a quarter more energy on average than medium-sized cars6. They are 
among the largest contributors to a rise in global emissions since 20106. 
Furthermore, by introducing an SUV Ferrari will increase units sold while not 
cannibalizing other models’ sales. Therefore, it might ruin its key appeal of 
exclusivity and the sense of luxury.  Consequently, its low volume strategy might 
be at risk, which prevents Ferrari to charge the usual high-end prices that 
customers are accustomed to pay.  
Nova Research Team believes that competing in the SUV market presents as a 
good opportunity for Ferrari to increase and diversify its revenue streams. In 
addition, since the Purosangue will offer a hybrid alternative, we do believe its 
sales will not be affected by eco-clients demands. Moreover, since the SUV market 
is projected to keep increasing in revenue and market share, we trust it is not too 
late for Ferrari to enter the game. Lastly, Nova Research Team strongly believes 
that Ferrari’s low volume strategy will not be affected by an increase in units 
shipped driven by the introduction of the SUV, since in the eyes of Ferrari 
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Source: Nova Research Team  
Figure 2: 
Luxury performance car market players 
 
 








increasing units produced reveals an increase in demand and does not necessarily 
destroy the aura of exclusivity if it is done in a sustainable way. 
5) Small vehicle manufacturer (SVM). This risk is more deeply approached in 
the individual part where Nova Research Team tries to breakdown by region and 
estimate in further detail the implications for Ferrari of losing the SVM status.        
Valuation 
In this report, Ferrari’s core business is analyzed separately from its non-core 
business activities such as employee benefits and investments in financial assets. 
Ferrari’s financial statements were analyzed from 2016 onwards because that is 
the year the separation from FCA is finalized and that Ferrari is operating 
“normally”. Nevertheless, for some items, we went further back in time to better 
understand its evolution. 
Ferrari’s Revenues 
§ Cars and spare parts 
This revenue stream includes not only the proceeds from the sale of cars but also 
of spare parts and servicing. Since Ferrari doesn’t provide a breakdown of these 
three sub-segments, we looked at industry peer Aston Martin and concluded that 
the breakdown should be: 92.8% for cars, 6.0% for spare parts, and 1.2% for 
servicing. As such, we applied these allocation rates to the historical revenues from 
cars and spare parts before starting the forecasting process. Handling the 
historical data was a necessary step to forecast spare parts and servicing based 
on car revenues. 
Nova Research Team decided not to breakdown revenues in geographical regions 
because Ferrari’s business has historically been very concentrated in Europe 
(Chart 31), and even though we recognize that emerging markets are relevant, we 
do not expect geographical operations to shift significantly.  
Product mix 
Historically, Ferrari’s sports range has been rather consistent. It is comprised of 
regular sports cars (in coupe and spider versions) and “super sports” cars, that are 
more expensive and powerful versions of the former. Historically, Ferrari’s regular 
sports cars represented 79% of sports units shipped, and the super sports 
represent 21%28 (Chart 32), a breakdown that we assume will remain constant. 
 
28 This analysis was conducted using JATO.com figures for units shipped of each model in Europe. We assume that the same super (expensive) versus 
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Chart 31: 
Geographical operations breakdown 
 
Source: Ferrari Annual Report 2018 
Chart 32: 
Historical super versus regular cars breakdown 
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Typically, once a new version of a model is introduced, the prior version is 
discontinued. Besides, a spider version is launched the same or following year as 
the coupe version, and both are discontinued at the same time. We assume that 
this process will continue. A significant change will occur in the sports range with 
the introduction of the SF90 Stradale, the company’s first series-production hybrid 
car, in 2020. It will contribute towards an increase in both price and quantities. We 
also expect the Stradale to have a spider version. 
Similar to the sports range, GT cars also display a very consistent lifecycle of its 
coupe and spider versions, so we also assumed that this trend will continue. Super 
GT models represented 34% of GT units shipped, and the regular models 66%28 
(Chart 32), a breakdown we assume will remain constant. 
Significant changes are expected to occur in the GT segment, thanks to the 
introduction of a V6 family in 2021 and the Purosangue (Ferrari’s SUV) in 2022. 
Perhaps the most significant change to occur in Ferrari’s product mix is the 
substantial incorporation of hybrid models. We assume that most of the upcoming 
models not yet announced will have hybrid powertrains (Table 2).  
Quantity 
Regarding quantities, we believe forecasting based on past behavior is a fair 
assumption. As a low volume manufacturer with waitlists of several years, Ferrari 
has never increased its production levels significantly. We do not expect future 
annual growth in units shipped to increase by more than what it has in the past 
(Chart 33), for the existing models and replacements29. The historical average of 
the growth in units shipped is 4.3%. However, in some years, we expect growth in 
units to be higher, considering that there will be not only replacement models but 
also completely new lines and models. In these cases, we use the third quartile 
growth rate in units shipped observed in the same historical period, which is 6.2%. 
In the sports range, we expect to observe the average growth rate, 4.3%, in 2019 
and the third quartile, 6.2%, from 2020 onwards (Chart 34), fueled by the 
introduction of the SF90 Stradale.  
In the GT range, the Purosangue (Ferrari’s SUV) was analyzed separately from 
other models. For the remaining models, we expect to observe the average growth 
rate of 4.3% in 2019 and 2020. From 2021 onwards, it will grow by the third quartile 
growth rate, 6.2%, to account for the introduction of the V6 family (Chart 35). 
 
29 New cars that share the same concept as existing models. For example, the F8 Tributo is a replacement for the 488 GTB. 
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Chart 34: 
Sports range units shipped per year 
(2019E-2025F) 
 
Source: Nova Research Team 
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Chart 35: 
GT range units shipped per year 
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Chart 33: 
Historical units shipped and units CAGR 
(2006-2018) 
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Future Models Start End Hybrid
Sports
812 Superfast 2017 2022
812 GTS 2020 2022
SF90 Stradale 2020 2025 (H)
SF90 Stradale Spider 2021 2025 (H)
Sucessor 812 Superfast 2022 2027 (H)
488 GTB 2015 2019
488 GTB Spider 2015 2019
F8 Tributo 2019 2023
F8 Tributo Spider 2020 2023
Sucessor of F8 Tributo 2023 2027 (H)
Sucessor of F8 Tributo Spider 2024 2027 (H)
GT
V6 2021 2024 (H)
Sucessor of V6 2024 2027 (H)
Portofino 2018 2022
Sucessor Portofino 2022 2025 (H)
Purosangue 2022 2025 (%H)
GTC4Lusso 2016 2020
GTC4Lusso T 2017 2020
Ferrari Roma 2020 2023
Ferrari Roma Spider 2021 2023




















































Hybridization across future models 
 
Source: Nova Investment Team 
 
 








As for the Purosangue, we analyzed the impact of launching an SUV for the first 
time on peers Lamborghini Urus and Rolls Royce Cullinan (Chart 36). We 
concluded that in the first year of shipments, the Purosangue will account for 22% 
of total units shipped30, which will increase by 53% on the second year of 
shipments. No data is available for the third year as no luxury performance car 
brand has had an SUV for longer than two years, so for the following years we 
assume a third quartile growth rate of 6.2% (Chart 35).  
Research suggests that the Purosangue will be made available in both hybrid and 
non-hybrid powertrains31, which the research team believes is a reasonable 
assumption considering Ferrari’s hybridization plans. According to national 
surveys, in the United States, between 10% and 30% of consumers indicated their 
preference to consider an EV as their next purchase. In Europe, the reported share 
of consumers considering EV purchase was higher, at 40% to 60% and in China, 
it was over 70%32. As such, we assume that in each year, 40%33 of Purosangue 
units shipped will be hybrids. 
Considering the total quantities forecasted for sport and GT ranges, the super 
versus regular breakdown (Tables 3), and the models that will be available each 
year, we arrive at the hybridization rates per year (Table 4). 
The Icona range is a new concept at Ferrari, only two models were introduced so 
far, and no further launches are expected during the forecasting period. According 
to research, only 500 units in total will be made34, of which we assume 100 will be 
sold in the first year (2019), 250 in the second year, and 150 in the third year. 
While pursuing the forecasting method described above, we assume that there will 
be demand for the quantities forecasted. This is consistent with the expected 
evolution of HNWI, Ferrari’s target consumers, and the new consumer pools 
attracted to the electrified and SUV models, mentioned in the industry overview. 
It is also our conviction that Ferrari will continue to be a sought-after brand by the 
wealthy, and that it will not be damaged by further increases in units manufactured. 
The topic of exclusivity was already addressed by the company’s commercial and 
brand director Enrico Galliera23. He believes that exclusivity is not a matter of 
numbers, rather, the numbers are related to the level of demand. In fact, we expect 
 
30 Where total units=sports range + GT range (including Purosangue) 
31 Autocar. 2019. “Ferrari's 2022 rapid luxury SUV detailed by technical boss”. Accessed January 2. https://www.autocar.co.uk/car-news/new-cars/ferraris-
2022-rapid-luxury-suv-detailed-technical-boss. 
32 McKinsey & Company. 2019. “Making electric vehicles profitable”. Accessed January 2. https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/automotive-and-
assembly/our-insights/making-electric-vehicles-profitable. 
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Chart 36: 
Lamborghini and Rolls Royce breakdown of 
units shipped in the first year of SUV sales 
Source: Company Annual Reports 
Table 3: 
Forecasted units breakdown between sports and 
GT ranges and super/regular models 
Ranges 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F
Sport (% total units) 67% 67% 52% 48% 48% 48%
Super Sport 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21%
Normal Sport 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79%
GT (% total units) 33% 33% 48% 52% 52% 52%
Super GT 34% 34% 18% 15% 15% 15%
Normal GT 66% 66% 36% 30% 30% 30%
Purosangue 0% 0% 46% 55% 55% 55%
Source: Nova Research Team 
“Is it more exclusive to sell 
5,000 than 10,000 cars?” 
Galleria continues. “I don’t 
think there is a clear answer. 
If you have the demand for 
12,000 cars, 10,000 is very 
exclusive. If you have the 
demand for 9,000 cars and 
you sell 10,000, it’s not 
exclusive. That is the 
measuring ratio, the number 
of cars versus the level of 
demand is what we look very 
carefully at.” 
Enrico Galliera 
(commercial and marketing director) 
Table 4: 
Percentage of hybrid cars per year, per range  
Source: Nova Research Team 
Hybrid models 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F
Super Sport 5% 7% 7% 10% 10% 10%
Normal Sport 0% 0% 0% 13% 38% 38%
Super GT 0% 0% 0% 3% 8% 8%
Normal GT 0% 11% 11% 16% 16% 16%
Purosangue 0% 0% 9% 12% 12% 12%
Total 5% 18% 27% 52% 83% 83%
 
 








demand to increase, as very anticipated products such as a SUV and 
hybrid/electric vehicles, as previously discussed, will soon be marketed. 
Price 
A detailed analysis of the historical and current sport and GT model prices35 and 
its evolution were at the base of our forecast. Future prices for these ranges were 
forecasted for each model the research team expects Ferrari will launch in the 
future (Table 5). For replacement models, the price was increased by the rate 
observed in the past36. For convertible models, a premium of 10%37 was applied 
to the price of its coupé counterpart. For hybrid models, a premium of 15%38 was 
applied to its non-hybrid counterpart.  
The first V6 model is expected to carry the same price as the most recent Portofino, 
the cheapest GT model available. For the Purosangue, a peer analysis was 
conducted. The average of the prices charged for comparable vehicles led to a 
price of €262,87939. No evolution on price was performed because the first version 
of the Purosangue is expected to be sold until 2025, inclusively, so no further 
versions will be introduced during the explicit forecasting period.  
Regarding the Icona range, according to research, both Icona models will have a 
manufacturer’s price of €1,224,624. As for other cars category, revenues were 
forecasted as the historical revenue average times its historical growth rate in the 
price. We took an average of the price growth in each sub-category (special series, 
fuori-serie, one-offs, track cars and hypercars) and arrived at a global annualized 
price growth rate of 6.2%.  By analyzing the lifecycles of the models included in 
this category, we concluded that the years 2016, 2017 and 2018 are a good proxy 
for forecasting, as it accounts for the phase-in and out of models. While we don’t 
believe that the quantities made available for these cars will change in the future, 
we expect its prices to increase, as it happened in the past. For this reason,  
Spare parts and Servicing 
Historically, spare parts and servicing represent 6.5% and 1.3%, respectively, of 
car revenues (Chart 37). We assume these rates will remain constant.  
 
35 The car prices used in this analysis reflect the prices practiced in the USA because it was the information that was more widely available. The prices found 
are before-tax, so to reach the manufacturer’s price we only deducted the dealer’s commission, which is around 10% for the luxury industry (Chron. 2018. 
“How Much Commission Does a Salesman Make on a New Car?”. Accessed January 2. https://work.chron.com/much-commission-salesman-make-new-car-
21232.html.) To convert the prices from USD to EUR, we used the conversion rates provided in Ferrari’s annual reports. 
36 An analysis was conducted for the super sports, regular sports, super GT and normal GT, to understand the price evolution from one model to the next. We 
concluded that super sports prices increase by 3.1%, regular sports by 4.9%, super GT by 0.4% and regular GT by 0.9%.  
37 Based on an historical analysis of Ferrari prices, including the F430, 458 Italia and 488 and its coupé counterparts, the research team concluded that 
convertible models are, on average, 10% more expensive. 
38 A peer analysis was conducted to understand what is the typical premium that a hybrid model has over its non-hybrid counterpart. The available peers were 
Porsche, BMW, Range Rover, Audi and Mercedes. Premiums range between 7% to 26%, with an average of 15%. 
39 Peers included: Lamborguini Urus (€268,570), Bentley Bentayga (€221,006), Rolls Royce Cullinan (€425,000), Porsche Cayenne Turbo S E-Hybrid 
(€184,453) and Mercedes Benz G63 (€215,500). This leads to a Purosangue retail price of €262,906 for the ICE and €302,101 for the hybrid powertrain. 
Future Models Price Hybrid
Sports
812 Superfast 292 700  
812 GTS 301 793  
SF90 Stradale 461 858  (H)
SF90 Stradale Spider 508 791  (H)
Sucessor 812 Superfast 357 558  (H)
488 GTB 207 623  
488 GTB Spider 230 702  
F8 Tributo 212 455  
F8 Tributo Spider 234 044  
Sucessor of F8 Tributo 255 984  (H)
Sucessor of F8 Tributo Spider 281 996  (H)
GT
V6 191 442  (H)
Sucessor of V6 193 139  (H)
Portofino 165 140  
Sucessor Portofino 191 442  (H)
Purosangue 262 879  (%H)
GTC4Lusso 245 485  
GTC4Lusso T 209 830  
Ferrari Roma 246 562  
Ferrari Roma Spider 271 617  




















































Forecasted prices per model in sports and 
GT range 
Source: Nova ResearchTeam 
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Chart 37: 
Revenues cars, spare parts and servicing 
(€ million, 2019E-2025F) 
Source: Nova Research Team 
 
 








§ Sponsorship, Commercial and Brand 
Ferrari’s F1 team, Scuderia Ferrari, counts with significant sponsorship 
agreements from companies such as Shell, Ray-Ban and Hublot. Research shows 
that from 2009 to 2018, total sponsorships averaged €1.8 million per year. 
However, sponsorship in F1 decreased 5.6%40 in 5 years (Chart 38), as companies 
find that other marketing initiatives are more worthwhile. We estimate that from 
2019 onwards, F1 sponsorships will decrease by 1.15% per year (Chart 39). 
For commercial revenues, a budget is set by F1 and is then split among the teams 
based on several criteria, not only prior year’s performance but also longevity. 
Ferrari’s commercial revenue varies over the years, but a significant portion is 
stable thanks to the participation and long-standing team payment.  
Commercial revenues for 2019 are already known. From 2020 onwards, we 
assume commercial revenues will equal the historical average, which amounts to 
€170 million41 per year (Chart 39).  
Finally, brand-related revenues come from merchandising, licensing, and royalty 
income. Most revenues come from Ferrari World Abu Dhabi and Ferrari fashion 
merchandising, which is rapidly moving towards the luxury segment. According to 
research, luxury fashion sales growth in 2019 and 2020 ranges from 4.0%-5.0%42, 
and amusement parks’ growth from 2020 to 2025 is estimated to be 5.8%43 per 
year. We used an average of these rates to arrive at future revenues (Chart 39). 
§ Engines 
Maserati 
Ferrari has produced engines for Maserati since 2003. Currently, it supplies 
Maserati with V8 and V6 engines, which account for 8% and 92% of the total 
revenue coming from Maserati, respectively. The number of engines produced in 
2018 decreased by 34%. This event is explained by the slowdown in Maserati car 
sales (a decrease of approximately 30% between 2017 and 2018). As 
aforementioned, Ferrari’s multi-year arrangement with Maserati to provide V6 
engines will terminate at the end of 2020. Moreover, Ferrari’s CEO announced that 
as of 2021 or 202244, it will no longer supply V8 engines to Maserati. Once that 
 
40 Forbes. 2019. “Revealed: Sponsors Fuel Formula One With $30 Billion”. Accessed January 2. https://www.forbes.com/sites/csylt/2019/05/19/revealed-
sponsors-fuel-formula-one-with-30-billion/#656c03fc2416. 
41 Average of Ferrari’s commercial revenues from 2016 to 2019 
42  McKinsey & Company. 2019. “The State of Fashion 2020: Navigating uncertainty”. Accessed January 2. https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/retail/our-
insights/the-state-of-fashion-2020-navigating-uncertainty. 
43 PR Newswire. 2019. “Amusement Parks Market Worth $70.83 Billion by 2025 | CAGR: 5.8%: Grand View Research, Inc.“. Accessed January 2. 
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/amusement-parks-market-worth-70-83-billion-by-2025--cagr-5-8-grand-view-research-inc-300799422.html. 
44 Driving. 2019. “Ferrari won't supply engines to Maserati after 2022”. Accessed January 2. https://driving.ca/ferrari/auto-news/news/ferrari-wont-supply-
engines-to-maserati-after-2022. 
Chart 38: 
Total F1 team sponsorship 
(2004-2018) 
Source: Formula Money Sponsorship Database 
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happens, Ferrari has no plans to sell engines to other automakers. Nova Research 
Team believes that in 2021 Ferrari will stop supplying V8 engines to Maserati. This 
conviction is connected with the fact that Maserati will want to find as soon as 
possible an engine supplier for the new models it will launch since it would not 
make sense to commercialize a new model with a Ferrari engine at first and then 
switch to a different supplier. To estimate future revenue coming from this 
segment, we use the following process: 
 
Ferrari’s margins on engine sales to Maserati have been increasing, explained by 
the start of engine F161’s production in 2016 to be installed on Maserati’s SUV, 
one of Maserati’s best-selling models (Chart 40). In the first nine months of 2019, 
Ferrari increased its revenue per engine sold to Maserati to €7.23 thousand. This 
shall be used as the revenue per engine up until 2022.  
Maserati announced plans to modernize its entire fleet plus introducing 10 new car 
models up until 202345. With that said, we believe 2019 will be a weak year for 
revenues since no new Maserati models are introduced, and their cars are even 
more outdated, which is the factor that has been driving Maserati sales down. In 
the first nine months of 2019, Maserati sales were down 45% compared to 2018. 
Therefore, to estimate 2019 Maserati units sold, we use -45% as the growth rate.  
Regarding the years from 2020 to 2022, they will be benevolent since Maserati will 
start selling nine new models between this period. Therefore, we used a growth 
rate that allowed the brand to reach its target of 100,00046 units sold in 2022. From 
2020 onwards, to calculate total revenue we multiply its revenue per engine sold 
by the units sold in that year. Afterwards, to account for the fact that in 2021 
Maserati only sells V8 engines, we multiply the total figure by its corresponding V8 
weight (8%) since it will no longer supply V6 engines, as aforementioned.     
Formula 1 Teams 
 When it comes to the sale of engines to F1 teams, historically, Ferrari has always 
supplied two teams per season except for the year 2016, where it supplied 3. For 
2019 and 202047, it will supply Haas and Alfa Romeo teams.  
Between 2010 to 2018, F1 engines have doubled in costs to produce48, which 
averages an increase in engine cost of 9.05% per year. Moreover, in 2021, F1 
 
45 Motor 1. 2019. "New Maserati, Facelifted Levante, Ghibli, Quattroporte Due In 2020". Accessed January 2. https://www.motor1.com/news/362744/new-
maserati-2020-models-updated/. 
46 Automotive News Europe. 2019. Maserati won't see profits until after product offensive starts in 2020”. Accessed January 2. 
https://europe.autonews.com/automakers/maserati-wont-see-profits-until-after-product-offensive-starts-2020. 
47 F1 fansite. 2019. “F1 Teams 2020 Overview”. Accessed January 2. https://www.f1-fansite.com/f1-teams/2020-f1-teams/ 
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Chart 40: 
Revenue per Maserati engine and 
Maserati units sold 
(€ thousand, 2016-2021F) 
Source: Nova Research Team 
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regulation will change, which will contribute to less expensive engines. According 
to Toto Wolf, Mercedes team principal, in 2018 it cost 16.5€ million48 to lease a 
Mercedes engine. Mercedes predicts that after 2021 it will only cost €11.5 million49  
to rent an engine.  
For the year of 2019, we multiplied the lease cost of an F1 engine50, while 
considering its rising historical growth cost (9.05%), by the number of engines 
supplied in 2018 (considering this number remains constant at four in 2019). In 
2020, we simply multiplied the 2019 figure by the engine cost growth rate of 9.05%. 
Regarding the years of 2021 to 2025, we multiply the expected lease cost of an 
engine (€11.5 million), assuming that the trend of rising costs in the production of 
engines persists, by the number of teams Ferrari supplies, which we assume it 
stays constant at 2, by the maximum number of engines an F1 team can use per 
season without getting a penalty, which is three51 (Chart 41).  
The breakdown of revenue per segment in the Engine business unit can be 
observed in Chart 42. 
§ Other 
Given the immateriality of this segment, we simply took the growth rate from 2017 
to 2018, which is 1.4%, and used it to estimate future revenues. From 2016 to 
2017, the revenues decreased because Ferrari N.V disinvested from FFS, so we 
considered it an unusual year and disregarded it for forecasting purposes. 
Ferrari’s Operating costs 
Costs (Chart 43) are mostly computed using ratios observed in the past. However, 
a more intricate analysis was conducted for Ferrari’s costs of sales52. These are 
mostly composed of materials and labor costs and are expected to change in the 
upcoming years, mainly due to the broad hybridization of Ferrari’s range models. 
Taxes 
 
Ferrari’s  business is subject to various taxations in different jurisdictions (mainly 
Italy), which include, among others, the Italian corporate income tax (“IRES”, which 
 
49 Motorsport. 2017. “F1 customer engine prices set to be lowest ever – Wolff”. Accessed January 2. https://www.motorsport.com/f1/news/customer-engine-
deals-lowest-ever-mercedes-943813/3041963/. 
50 We used the cost of leasing a Mercedes engine to compute the revenue for the years of 2019 and 2020 since we believe this is a good proxy for the cost of 
leasing a Ferrari engine. The reasoning comes from the fact that: 1) these two teams are always fighting for the World Championship; 2) when F1 teams are 
looking for an engine to lease, they care about reliability. In this parameter, a Ferrari engine is as reliable, if not more, than a Mercedes’. Furthermore, it is not 
the engine that has enabled Mercedes to win the F1 Championship consecutively, but the aerodynamics of the car, which are not related to the engine. 
Therefore, Nova Research Team believes F1 teams would pay similar amounts to lease either one of the engines.  
51 FIA. 2019. “2021 Formula 1 sporting regulations”. Accessed January 2. https://www.fia.com/sites/default/files/2021_formula_1_sporting_regulations_-
_2019-10-31_1.pdf. 
52 Silva, Joana. 2019. “How electric vehicles will impact Ferrari’s margins”. 
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Chart 45: 
Impact of Patent Box in Effective Tax rate 
(€ million, 2016-2025F) 
Source: Annual Report 2018l Nova Research Team 
for the past three years has been constant at 24%) and regional trade tax (“IRAP”, 
which is 3.9%) (Chart 44). In 2018, Ferrari N.V. signed an agreement with the 
Italian Revenue Agency in relation to the Patent Box tax regime. The regime 
provides tax benefits for companies that generate income through the use, both 
direct and indirect, of copyrights, patents, trademarks, designs, and know-how3. 
The agreement is valid for a period of 5 years and is irrevocable and renewable. 
The current Patent Box ruling for Ferrari expires at the end of fiscal 2019. Ferrari’s 
ability to renew the regime is contingent on future changes to Italian tax legislation.  
The firm already applied for a new ruling for the period from 2020 to 2024. “The 
Decree underlines that subjects which may elect for the regime are the holders of 
the economic right to use the IP (this makes the regime available not only to 
owners of the IP but also to licensees) provided they carry out R&D activities. 
Those who cannot elect for the regime are companies subject to bankruptcy 
procedures or being compulsory wound up or the extraordinary administration of 
large firms in crisis”53. Therefore, in our analysis, we believe Ferrari will be able to 
use this regime forever54 (since “forever” is a dangerous assumption, we further 
analyze this hypothesis in the “Sensitivity Analysis” section).  
Historically, Ferrari has paid an effective tax rate between 25-30%. However, in 
2018 its effective tax rate was only 3.5% (Chart 45), since it used the benefits from 
the Patent Box it accumulated from 2015 to 2018. In total, these benefits amounted 
to €202 million (Chart 45). With that said, to predict Ferrari’s effective tax rate, we 
separated it in several items: a) we multiply the pre-tax profit by the statutory tax 
rate (24%); b) afterwards, we sum the taxes coming from IRAP (3.9%)55; c) lastly, 
we subtract benefits coming from the Patent Box56.  
Balance Sheet 
§ Property, Plant and Equipment 
1) PP&E excluding the effects of IFRS 16. Ferrari’s PP&E is mostly comprised 
of plant, machinery and equipment, followed by industrial buildings and advances 
and assets under construction, totaling a carrying amount of €850 million in fiscal 
2018. Over the years, this item has been increasing due to additions mainly related 
to car production and engine assembly lines (including those for models to be 
launched in future years), industrial tools used for the production of cars, and 
 
53 Expert guides. 2019. “The Patent Box and the recent development under the Italian tax rules. Accessed January 2. 
https://www.expertguides.com/articles/the-patent-box-and-the-recent-development-under-the-italian-tax-rules/arxrwjgy. 
54 Since this regime was only signed on 29 July 2015, Nova Research Team is unable to estimate the probability of Ferrari being able to consecutively 
renew its option by looking to other firms track records. 
55 To forecast these taxes, we use the historical value of IRAP taxes Ferrari paid in 2018 and assume it will remain constant for the coming fiscal years. 
56 To forecast the benefits, we calculate them as a percentage of intangible assets since it is correlated with this item. 
Chart 44: 
Total income core taxes 
(€ million, 2016-2025F) 
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Chart 47: 
Intangible assets and amortization 
(€ million, 2016-2025F) 
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Chart 46: 
Property, plant and equipment, leases and 
depreciation 
(€ million, 2016-2025F) 
Source: Annual Report 2018 and Nova Research Team 
personalization programs3. We expect that this item will continue to increase as 
investments are necessary for hybridization and broadening of the product range 
to support future launches. We forecasted this item as the percentage of revenues 
observed in 2018 (Chart 46). 
2) PP&E including the effects of IFRS 16. From January 1, 2019, the company 
applies the mandatory IFRS 16, which sets new standards for the recognition of 
leases, which will impact PP&E because most of the lease agreements relate to 
Ferrari stores and industrial equipment. As such, this item will increase by the right-
of-use-asset, which the company estimates at €59.3 million as of September 2019. 
According to the company, the right-of-use-asset is categorized as plant, 
machinery and equipment, industrial buildings, and other assets. In the case of the 
first two, we assumed that these individual figures will increase by an average of 
the historical growth rate, 6.4%, and 4.1%, respectively. As for other assets, we 
assume it will grow in line with the growth of owned Ferrari stores, which has an 
annualized growth rate of 12.3%. After forecasting the lease asset, we add it to the 
remaining PP&E, mentioned above (Chart 46).  
§ Intangible assets 
Ferrari’s intangible assets are predominantly externally acquired and internally 
generated development costs. These reflect the capitalization of R&D costs for the 
creation of new and existing models. As expected, this item has been increasing 
over the years (24% in 2017 and 47% in 2018) and we project that this trend will 
continue, as the company is revamping its entire range to include new 
technologies. Similarly to PP&E, this item was forecasted as a percentage of 
revenues and set it equal to the 2018 ratio (Chart 47). 
§ Debt 
Debt has four main components: borrowings from banks, bonds, securitization, 
and lease liabilities, for which we assume book value equals market value (Chart 
48).  
1) Borrowings from banks. To assist in the separation from FCA, Ferrari entered 
in a €2.5 billion facility which comprised a Bridge loan (€500 million), a Term loan 
(€1,500 million) and an RCF (€500 million). In 2016 and 2017, Ferrari fully repaid 
the Bridge Loan and the Term Loan. Nonetheless, the RCF is still undrawn to this 
day and is considered an off-balance sheet item. Currently, borrowings from banks 
relate mainly to financial liabilities of FFS Inc to support the financial services 
operations. FFS Inc main activities are offering retail clients financing for the 
purchase of Ferrari cars and dealer financing. Consequently, we forecast this 
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component has a percentage of total revenue from cars since FFS Inc will grow 
accordingly to the car sales. 
2) Bonds. Ferrari issued two bonds, one with maturity until 2021 and another until 
2023. To forecast this component, we assume Ferrari rolls over its debt, meaning 
it will issue 3 more bonds until 2025. We also assume it can issue its future bonds 
with the exact same characteristics has the past bonds (same issue costs, YTM, 
coupon, maturity, and price). Our reasoning correlates with the rationale behind 
why Ferrari issued bonds in the first place. It did so it could pay both the Bridge 
loan and Term loan in which incurred to help in the separation process from FCA. 
We do not foresee a future event that will compel Ferrari to raise its debt 
outstanding. In addition, we also believe Ferrari is better off not repaying its own 
debt entirely since the automotive industry is very capital intensive hence, in the 
near/medium future, it will require cash to support its future operational activities, 
continue its R&D expenditures and execute the buyback program.  
3) Securitization. Starting in 2016, FFS Inc has pursued a strategy of self-
financing, further reducing dependence on intercompany funding and increasing 
the portion of self-liquidating debt with various securitization transactions3. 
Securitization consists of three revolving programs that support FFS Inc having 
available capital so that it can then be loaned to clients and dealerships when 
buying Ferrari’ s.  We decided to forecast this component as a percentage of total 
revenue from car sales. 
4) Lease Liabilities. We set the lease liabilities equal to the right-of-use asset, 
previously described in the Property, Plant and Equipment section.  
Annuity Period 
Ferrari’s core business will face significant changes during the explicit forecasting 
period, so it does not achieve a stable state (Chart 49). In the short-term, Ferrari 
will disburse vast sums of capital in renovating its fleet, factories, and technology. 
Hence, its RONIC will be negative and below ROIC. From 2022 to 2025, RONIC 
becomes positive, primarily driven by cash flows from cars and spare parts. 
However, there is an unfavorable product mix as the years go by related to a rise 
in manufacturer costs of hybrid cars, contributing towards a decline in RONIC. 
To address this, an annuity period was included in the valuation. The core result 
and invested capital were projected until 2030, using key ratios from the last year 
of the explicit forecasting period, 2025. Regarding revenues, we expect it to grow 
Chart 49: 
Core business Free Cash Flow 
(€ million, 2019E-2025F) 
Source: Nova Research team 
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Chart 50: 
ROIC, RONIC and IR 
(2016-2030F) 
Source: Nova Research Team 
at 5% per year, from 2026 to 2030, consistent with fashion luxury industry sales42 
and luxury automotive industry long-term revenue growth57. 
With this approach, Ferrari achieves a steady state in the last five forecasting 
years, characterized by a FCF growth rate of 5.0%, a ROIC and RONIC of 28.4% 
and an investment rate of 16.8% (Chart 50).  
Discount rate 
In the long-run the operational risk of a company will converge to the market. To 
select comparable companies, Nova Research team collected data on several 
players not only on the automotive industry but also on the luxury industry. We 
narrowed the list down based on 10 metrics: market cap, enterprise value, short- 
and long-term debt, cash and marketable securities, revenue, revenue 5 year 
CAGR, EBITDA, EBIT, net income and operating margin. Taking the median of 
comparables’ unlevered beta adjusted for cash58, including Ferrari’s (Table 6), an 
equity beta of 0.91 is obtained. Using the CAPM formula with a risk-free rate of -
0.36%59 and a forward-looking market risk premium of 5.69%60, we arrive at a 
levered cost of equity of 4.84% (Table 7). 
Given the BBB+ rating assigned to Ferrari by CRIF Ratings Agency61, the annual 
default rate is 0.5%62. Given the expected loss rate given default for unsecured 
debt of 60%62 and the YTM of the longer-term bond issued by the company (Bond 
2023) of 1.7%, the cost of debt is 1.36%63 (Table 7). 
Finally, an iteration-based analysis was performed to achieve the company’s long-
term D/E ratio, set at 5.73%64, and consistent with the evolution of the ratio over 
the recent years. Using Ferrari’s statutory tax rate of 24%, we arrive at a WACC of 
4.6% which is used to discount core free cash flows generated by the company 
after fiscal year 2020.  
 
57 Mordor Intelligence. 2019. “Luxury car market- growth, trends, and forecast (2019-2024)”. Accessed January 2. 
https://www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/luxury-car-market 
58 The betas were computed by regressing the weekly excess returns of each company’s stock price, from Jan 2016 until Oct 2019, against the excess returns 
of the selected proxy for the market portfolio, the Eurostoxx 50. The selected risk-free rate was the 10-year German Government Bond, because Ferrari’s main 
shareholders are European long-term investors. 
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59 Return on the 10Y German Government Bond on the 29th of October 2019. 
60 The forward-looking market risk premium was obtained by forecasting the forward-looking return of the Eurostoxx 50, taking its price on the 29th of October 
2019 and projecting it until 2030 (to match our forecasting horizon) using the historical growth rate of 4.7%. The cash flows associated with the Eurostoxx 50 
are estimated as 3.58% of the price, which is based on historical figures. Discounting these cash flows to arrive at the current price implies a discount rate of 
5.33%, which is the forward-looking return on the market. We then deduct the current risk-free rate (-0.36%) to arrive at the forward-looking market risk premium 
61 CRIF Ratings. 2019. “CRIF Ratings has affirmed Ferrari’s long-term issuer rating at “BBB+/Stable”. Accessed January 2. 
https://www.crifratings.com/en/rating-actions/ferrari-spa-12042019-rating-update-unsolicited/. 
62 Moody’s Global Credit Policy. 2012. “Corporate Defaults and Recovery Rates, 1920-2011”.  
63 𝑟P = 𝑌𝑇𝑀 − 𝑃(𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡) × 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠	𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛	𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 
64 In this analysis, we discovered what would be the necessary D/E ratio for the market cap yielded by the DCF model to equal the market value of equity 
implied by the ratio itself. The debt value used in this analysis was the book value of debt in 2020F. 
Table 6: 
Comparable companies’ unlevered betas 
Source: Nova Research Team 
 
 βu  βu adjusted for cash 
 Ferrari 1,03 1,07
Automotive Industry
 BMW 0,39 0,44
 Daimler 0,33 0,39
 Renault 0,38 0,49
 General Motors 0,33 0,40
 Fiat Chrysler  0,95 1,74
 Volkswagen 0,35 0,45
 Audi 0,27 0,81
 Schaeffler 0,76 0,84
Luxury Industry
 LVMH 0,89 0,95
 Hermés 0,58 1,16
 Burberry 0,72 0,83
 Moncler 0,84 0,89
 Richemont 0,69 0,96
 Average 0,61 0,82
 Median 0,63 0,84
Table 7: 
Cost of equity, Cost of debt and WACC 
Source: Nova Research Team 
Beta 0,91
Risk free rate (annual) -0,4%
MRP (Forward-Looking Eurostoxx 50) 5,7%
 Cost of Equity 4,8%
YTM (Bond 2023) 1,7%
P(default) (BBB+) 0,5%
Expected loss rate 60%













To perform a DCF valuation, we computed the core business free cash flow65 until 
2030 and discounted it using the WACC from 2021 onwards. We then calculated 
the core terminal value using the terminal value growth rate of 2.5%66, slightly 
above the expected inflation of 2.1%67(Chart 51). 
The non-core business was valued at book value68 of fiscal 2020 because we 
believe that using the DCF method with the same discount rate used for the core 
business would mislead the valuation. For instance, financial investments are not 
part of the company's main business and are thus subject to different value drivers. 
In the case of employee benefits, we believe these are not strictly necessary for 
Ferrari’s operations.  
With an enterprise value of €38,313 million and net financial assets of -€1,271 
million, we arrive at an equity value of €37,042 million in 2020 (Chart 52). As the 
forecasted number of common shares outstanding is 185,164,44169, the implied 
share price is €200.05. 
Multiples Valuation 
To perform a multiples valuation, we selected a set of comparable companies 
(Table 8) based on a wide range of criteria, as previously mentioned. Forward-
looking enterprise value and equity value multiples were extracted from Thomson 
Reuters Eikon for the year 2020 (Table 9), and the 4th quartile of the sample was 
used to value Ferrari. We made this decision because comparable companies 
trade at very low multiples compared to Ferrari, particularly automotive industry 
peers. Ferrari is in a unique position as it is the only stand-alone publicly traded 
luxury automotive manufacturer, so there are no true available comparables.   
Given the industry characteristics, we believe that sales multiples may be 
misleading since the companies have very different margins. The P/E ratio may 
also be misleading since it is highly affected by the company’s capital structure. 
 
65 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒	𝐹𝐶𝐹w = 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒	𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡w − 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒	𝑖𝑛	𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒	𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙w 
66 Nova Research Team believes that in perpetuity RONIC will equal WACC. Ferrari will eventually lose its competitive advantages, which are mainly related 
to the driver experience. In an ever-changing industry where one day CASE mobility will dominate, Ferrari might not be able to sustain its superiority as a 
manufacturer of luxury cars. We believe it is better to take a conservative view regarding very far into the future growth opportunities. Furthermore, Ferrari N.V 
also shares a conservative view regarding their future growth opportunities. In the Annual Report 2018 it reports a long-term growth rate of 2%.   
67 Average of expected inflation from 2022 onwards for the geographies where the company operates, weighted by the revenues generated by each geographic 
area in 2018. (Inflation rates: Europe 1.8%, USA 2.0%, China 3.0%, APAC 3.4%). European Central Bank Eurosystem. 2020. "HICP Inflation forecasts". 
Accessed January 2. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/ecb_surveys/survey_of_professional_forecasters/html/table_hist_hicp.en.html. International Monetary 
Fund. 2019. "Inflation rate, average consumer prices Annual percent change". Accessed January 2. https://www.imf.org/. Federal Open Market Committee. 
2019. "Economic projections of Federal Reserve Board members and Federal Reserve Bank presidents under their individual assessments of projected 
appropriate monetary policy, June 2019". Accessed January 2. https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcprojtabl20190619.htm. 
68 The valuation of the non-core business using book values lies in the assumption that book values are a good proxy for market values. 
69 Departing from the 187,921 thousand common shares outstanding reported in the Annual Report 2018, we deducted the repurchases planned for 2019 
(2,769 thousand shares) and added the common shares issued under the equity incentive plan reported in the Q3 2019 report (358 thousand). Share 
repurchases in 2020 are expected to occur only in the first half of the year16 so we took an average of half of the repurchases of 2018 and 2019 (951 thousand 
shares). As for the share issuances, we estimated the PSUs and RSUs to vest in 2020 to equal 605 thousand shares. This leads to a total of 185,164 thousand 
shares outstanding by the Dec 31 2020.  
Chart 51: 
Core business DCF valuation waterfall 
(€ million, 2020F) 
Source: Nova Research Team 
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Table 8: 
Comparable companies KPIs 
(€ million, Dec 31 2018) 
Source: Bloomberg 
Note: D/E ratio in market values, assuming MVD=BVD 




 Ferrari 16 381                 12% 827           7,9          24           
Automotive Industry
 BMW 46 014                 222% 9 071       5,1          9              
 Daimler 49 116                 295% 10 266    7,2          6              
 Renault 16 132                 327% 2 987       7,0          5              
 General Motors 42 610                 222% 4 012       1,1-          3              
 Fiat Chrysler  19 579                 74% 5 164       5,0          5              
 Volkswagen 69 693                 274% 13 920    3,7          6              
 Audi 33 626                 12% 3 509       3,5          6              
 Schaeffler 4 967                    67% 1 354       4,9          10           
Luxury Industry
 LVMH 130 415              8% 9 854       10,0       21           
 Hermés 51 180                 2% 2 128       9,7          36           
 Burberry 8 213                    0% 475           6,5          15           
 Moncler 7 401                    1% 414           19,6       29           
 Richemont 44 690                 17% 1 673       1,6          8              
 
 








Ferrari has a meager D/E ratio compared to peers, so the P/E ratio is not the most 
appropriate multiple. We put more emphasis on EBITDA and EBIT multiples. The 
latter is particularly appropriate as it accounts for the impact of CAPEX, which is of 
paramount importance in capital-intensive industries such as the auto. Ferrari’s 
multiples valuation results in a share price of €96 (Chart 53), which leads to a sell 
recommendation. 
As previously mentioned, we believe Ferrari has no available true comparables, 
and to arrive at a reasonable valuation, we had to take the very optimistic view that 
Ferrari is among the best performers in the selected sample. For this reason, and 
the wide range of share prices achieved through the different multiples, we believe 
this method is not the most appropriate for this company.  
Sensitivity Analysis 
Nova Research team performed a sensitivity analysis (Chart 54) by changing the 
following four inputs in an interval between -20% and 20% since we believe they 
either meaningfully impact the share price or are yet to be defined in a future 
period: 1) long-term growth rate; 2) weighted average cost of capital; 3) Patent 
Box, in our model, as previously mentioned, we assume Ferrari will be able to 
collect benefits from this regime forever. We do believe this is an optimistic 
assumption, so it is vital to assess the impact if the regime ends in different periods 
throughout the valuation; 4) number of shares outstanding, Ferrari is currently 
performing a share buyback program that will end until June 2020. Moreover, 
Ferrari has dilutive shares (PSUs and RSUs), and their issuance depends upon 
certain targets to be met in the future. 
Moreover, the following variables were also analysed: 5) growth rate of both price 
and quantity for the sports, GT, and other classes; 6) Purosangue quantity growth 
rate. However, Nova Research Team concluded their variance is negligible when 
the interval mentioned above is applied.  
Lastly, we computed a 95% confidence interval for the unlevered beta of Ferrari 
and selected comparable companies. Nova Research Team concluded that the 
stock price is highly sensitive to changes in this input. This is explained by the 




 RACE IM Equity  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4 
EV/Revenue 7,4x 0,9x 1,3x 3,2x 9,0x
EV/EBITDA 20,8x 7,8x 11,1x 13,2x 22,9x
EV/EBIT 28,7x 12,6x 17,4x 18,3x 26,4x
P/E 37,2x 6,0x 8,7x 23,7x 40,7x
P/Sales 7,1x 0,3x 0,4x 3,0x 9,3x
P/Book 12,4x 0,7x 1,4x 4,9x 8,9x
Table 9: 
Forward-looking multiples  
(FY2020) 
Source: Thomson Reuters Eikon 
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Reformulated Income Statement 2016 2017 2018 2019E 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F
Core
Revenue 3 105 084   3 416 890    3 420 321   3 671 611   4 040 252   4 227 936   5 063 949   5 961 135   6 569 637    6 951 586    
Cost of sales 1 352 009-   1 448 744-    1 408 575-   1 512 062-   1 725 918-   1 823 531-   2 256 061-   2 672 691-   2 970 830-    3 122 373-    
SG&A 290 211-       303 762-        306 163-       332 741-       366 149-       383 158-       458 922-       540 230-       595 376-        629 990-        
Other expenses, net 9 032-             6 470-              2 736-             9 547-             9 547-             9 547-             9 547-             9 547-             9 547-              9 547-              
R&D 507 153-       553 585-        524 851-       563 411-       619 980-       648 780-       777 067-       914 740-       1 008 116-    1 066 726-    
Provisions 82 418-          13 473-           15 573-          21 627-          24 544-          25 886-          31 832-          37 608-          41 724-           43 853-           
Depreciation & Amortization 247 717-       260 606-        288 748-       412 971-       547 440-       602 335-       631 076-       754 201-       886 397-        976 839-        
Rent 14 820-          16 964-           15 358-          -                   -                   -                   -                   -                   -                   -                   
Result before taxes 601 725       813 286        858 318       819 251       746 674       734 698       899 443       1 032 117   1 057 648    1 102 258    
Adjusted taxes 177 087       224 871        29 607          138 200       112 424       105 295       125 882       137 385       129 718        131 765        
Core result 424 638       588 415        828 711       681 052       634 249       629 403       773 561       894 732       927 931        970 492        
TRUE TRUE TRUE
Non-core
Result from Investments 3 066             2 437              2 665             2 914             3 187             3 485             3 811             4 168             4 558              4 984              
Pension expenses 9 709-             40 307-           34 476-          29 798-          29 154-          29 684-          34 294-          38 319-          39 997-           41 972-           
Result before taxes 6 643-             37 870-           31 811-          26 883-          25 967-          26 198-          30 483-          34 151-          35 439-           36 988-           
Adjusted taxes 1 827-             9 089-              7 635-             6 452-             6 232-             6 288-             7 316-             8 196-             8 505-              8 877-              
OCI 36 929          9 678              3 093-             -                   -                   -                   -                   -                   -                   -                   
Non-core result 32 113          19 103-           27 269-          20 431-          19 735-          19 911-          23 167-          25 955-          26 934-           28 111-           
Financial 
Net Financial Expenses 27 729-          29 260-           23 563-          26 082-          27 670-          28 000-          30 988-          33 969-          35 861-           36 782-           
Result before taxes 27 729-          29 260-           23 563-          26 082-          27 670-          28 000-          30 988-          33 969-          35 861-           36 782-           
Adjusted taxes 7 625-             7 022-              5 655-             6 260-             6 641-             6 720-             7 437-             8 153-             8 607-              8 828-              
Non-controllling interest (OCI) 134-                 337-                  50-                    -                   -                   -                   -                   -                   -                   -                   
Financial result 20 238-          22 575-           17 958-          19 822-          21 029-          21 280-          23 551-          25 817-          27 254-           27 954-           
Consolidated result 436 513       546 737        783 484       640 798       593 485       588 212       726 843       842 961       873 742        914 427        
Historical Explicit forecast period
 
 







































Reformulated Balance Sheet 2016 2017 2018 2019E 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F
Core Invested Capital
Goodwill 785 182       785 182        785 182        785 182        785 182        785 182        785 182       785 182        785 182       785 182       
Intangible assets 354 394       440 456        645 797        881 187        969 660        1 014 705    1 215 348   1 430 672    1 576 713   1 668 381   
Property, plant and equipment 669 283       710 260        850 550        1 160 797    1 276 972    1 339 466    1 597 137   1 873 916    2 064 936   2 188 936   
Inventories 323 998       393 765        391 064        419 795        479 168        506 269        626 353       742 022        824 794       866 867       
Trade receivables 243 977       239 410        211 399        257 560        283 419        296 585        355 231       418 167        460 853       487 646       
Other current assets 53 729          45 441           64 295           60 460           66 530           69 621           83 387          98 161           108 181       114 470       
Cash and cash equivalents 62 102          68 338           68 406           73 432           80 805           84 559           101 279       119 223        131 393       139 032       
Provisions 215 227-       197 392-        182 539-        180 575-        181 528-        183 823-        192 065-       206 082-        224 215-       244 477-       
Other liabilities 656 275-       620 350-        589 743-        633 071-        696 634-        728 995-        873 143-       1 027 838-    1 132 758-   1 198 615-   
Trade payables 614 888-       607 505-        653 751-        674 506-        769 903-        813 447-        1 006 392-   1 192 243-    1 325 238-   1 392 839-   
Total core invested capital 1 006 275   1 257 605    1 590 660    2 150 260    2 293 672    2 370 121    2 692 316   3 041 179    3 269 841   3 414 583   
Non-core invested capital
Investments and other financial assets 33 935          30 038           32 134           35 140           38 428           42 023           45 955          50 254           54 956          60 098          
Receivables from financing activities 790 377       732 947        878 496        888 402        977 601        1 023 014    1 225 300   1 442 388    1 589 624   1 682 043   
Current financial assets 16 276          15 683           10 174           14 044           14 044           14 044           14 044          14 044           14 044          14 044          
Deferred tax assets 119 357       94 091           60 744           60 744           60 744           60 744           60 744          60 744           60 744          60 744          
Current tax receivables 1 312             6 125              128 234        35 646           38 852           40 484           47 753          55 555           60 847          64 168          
Employee benefits 91 024-          84 159-           86 575-           94 096-           102 514-        107 491-        125 118-       144 010-        157 384-       166 451-       
Other financial liabilities 39 638-          1 444-              11 342-           17 475-           17 475-           17 475-           17 475-          17 475-           17 475-          17 475-          
Deferred tax liabilities 13 111-          10 977-           39 142-           39 142-           39 142-           39 142-           39 142-          39 142-           39 142-          39 142-          
Current tax payables 41 595-          29 160-           7 635-              7 635-              7 635-              7 635-              7 635-             7 635-              7 635-             7 635-             
Total non-core invested capital 775 889       753 144        965 088        875 629        962 903        1 008 566    1 204 427   1 414 725    1 558 580   1 650 394   
Total invested capital 1 782 164   2 010 749    2 555 748    3 025 890    3 256 575    3 378 687    3 896 744   4 455 904    4 828 420   5 064 976   
Equity
Equity attributable to owners of the parent 324 995       778 678        1 348 722    1 805 656    1 985 210    2 097 490    2 567 138   3 088 420    3 429 789   3 647 043   
Total equity 324 995       778 678        1 348 722    1 805 656    1 985 210    2 097 490    2 567 138   3 088 420    3 429 789   3 647 043   
Net Financial Assets
Cash and cash equivalents 395 682       579 368        725 258        778 542        856 710        896 507        1 073 779   1 264 021    1 393 050   1 474 040   
Debt 1 848 041   1 806 181    1 927 167    1 993 642    2 122 926    2 172 539    2 398 202   2 626 306    2 786 466   2 886 742   
Non-controlling interests 4 810             5 258              5 117              5 133              5 150              5 166              5 182             5 199              5 215             5 232             
Total net financial assets 1 457 169-   1 232 071-    1 207 026-    1 220 233-    1 271 365-    1 281 197-    1 329 606-   1 367 483-    1 398 631-   1 417 933-   
Historical Explicit forecast period
(€ thousand)
2016 2017 2018 2019E 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F 2027F 2028F 2029F 2030F
Core Business
Core result 424 638                     588 415            828 711            681 052           634 249            629 403            773 561            894 732            927 931            970 492            1 019 017        1 069 968        1 123 466        1 179 640        1 238 622        
Core invested capital 1 006 275                 1 257 605        1 590 660        2 150 260       2 293 672        2 370 121        2 692 316        3 041 179        3 269 841        3 414 583        3 585 312        3 764 578        3 952 806        4 150 447        4 357 969        
Change in core invested capital -                                251 330            333 056            559 600           143 411            76 449               322 195            348 863            228 662            144 742            170 729            179 266            188 229            197 640            207 522            
Core FCF 424 638                     337 085            495 656            121 452           490 838            552 954            451 366            545 870            699 269            825 750            848 288            890 702            935 237            981 999            1 031 099        
Terminal Value
Core DCF 490 838            528 476            412 289            476 539            583 433            658 464            646 492            648 768            651 051            653 343            655 643            31 435 994                 
Growth in FCF 0,0% -20,6% 47,0% -75,5% 304,1% 12,7% -18,4% 20,9% 28,1% 18,1% 2,7% 5,0% 5,0% 5,0% 5,0%
Growth in Core result 0,0% 38,6% 40,8% -17,8% -6,9% -0,8% 22,9% 15,7% 3,7% 4,6% 5,0% 5,0% 5,0% 5,0% 5,0%
ROIC 42,2% 46,8% 52,1% 31,7% 27,7% 26,6% 28,7% 29,4% 28,4% 28,4% 28,4% 28,4% 28,4% 28,4% 28,4%
RONIC 0,0% 65,2% 72,1% -26,4% -32,6% -6,3% 44,7% 34,7% 14,5% 29,4% 28,4% 28,4% 28,4% 28,4% 28,4%
IR 0,0% 42,7% 40,2% 82,2% 22,6% 12,1% 41,7% 39,0% 24,6% 14,9% 16,8% 16,8% 16,8% 16,8% 16,8%
RONIC*IR (=growth in core result) 0,0% 20,0% 20,9% 26,0% 6,3% 3,2% 12,0% 11,5% 7,0% 4,2% 4,8% 4,8% 4,8% 4,8% 4,8%
Non-Core Business
Non-Core result 32 113                        19 103-               27 269-               20 431-              19 735-               19 911-               23 167-               25 955-               26 934-               28 111-               
Non-Core invested capital 775 889                     753 144            965 088            875 629           962 903            1 008 566        1 204 427        1 414 725        1 558 580        1 650 394        
Change in non-core invested capital -                                22 745-               211 944            89 459-              87 274               45 663               195 861            210 297            143 855            91 814               
Non-Core FCF 32 113                        3 642                  239 213-            69 028              107 009-            65 574-               219 028-            236 252-            170 789-            119 925-            
Financial
Financial result 20 238-                        22 575-               17 958-               19 822-              21 029-               21 280-               23 551-               25 817-               27 254-               27 954-               
Net Financial Assets 1 457 169-                 1 232 071-        1 207 026-        1 220 233-       1 271 365-        1 281 197-        1 329 606-        1 367 483-        1 398 631-        1 417 933-        
Change in NFA -                                225 098            25 044               13 207-              51 132-               9 832-                  48 409-               37 878-               31 148-               19 302-               
Debt cash flows 20 238-                        202 523            7 087                  33 030-              72 161-               31 112-               71 959-               63 694-               58 403-               47 256-               
Equity 324 995                     778 678            1 348 722        1 805 656       1 985 210        2 097 490        2 567 138        3 088 420        3 429 789        3 647 043        
Change in Equity -                                453 683            570 044            456 934           179 554            112 281            469 648            521 282            341 369            217 254            
Comprehensive Income 436 513                     546 737            783 484            640 798           593 485            588 212            726 843            842 961            873 742            914 427            
Equity cash flows 436 513-                     93 054-               213 440-            183 864-           413 932-            475 932-            257 196-            321 678-            532 373-            697 173-            
Financing CF 456 751-                     109 469            206 354-            216 893-           486 093-            507 043-            329 155-            385 373-            590 776-            744 429-            
Annuity periodHistorical Explicit forecast period
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The presented work project has the objective of determining the impact of electric vehicle 
production on the operating margins of luxury car manufacturer Ferrari. A model was 
developed to determine the specifications of each individual plug-in hybrid model that is 
expected to be launched during the 2019 to 2025 period. Subsequently, the manufacturing 
costs of both internal combustion engine and plug-in hybrid vehicles were forecasted for each 
year, which differ based on the specific active models and the evolution of battery prices. We 
concluded that Ferrari’s operating margins will deteriorate, compared to 2018, as the 
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I. Demand for electric vehicles 
EV sales grew to more than 2 million units globally 
in 2018, an increase of 63% on a year-on-year basis1. 
Nevertheless, EVs still only represent a fraction of 
the overall light-vehicle market. However, this reality 
is expected to change, with EVs capturing more and 
more market share in the years to come (Chart I).  
II. Types of powertrains  
Nowadays, there are many alternatives to the traditional internal combustion engine (ICE) 
powertrain. Electric vehicles are achieved through the electrification of the automotive 
powertrain. They include mild hybrid electric vehicles (MHEVs), hybrid electric vehicles 
(HEVs), plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) and battery electric vehicles (BEVs). 
Ferrari’s product offering has traditionally been exclusively ICE vehicles. However, that is 
about to change with the introduction of the SF90 Stradale in 2020, the company’s first PHEV. 
III. Supply of EV batteries 
According to a market model developed by BCG2 , global capacity for battery cell production 
will exceed market demand by approximately 40% in 2021. Given the planned expansions in 
battery production, supply is expected to more than double. And even though global demand 
for batteries is expected to increase significantly, as we’ve seen above, it will not catch up with 
the production capacity in the near term. 
IV. Ferrari’s manufacturing costs 
 
1 McKinsey & Company. 2019. “Expanding electric-vehicle adoption despite early growing pains”. Accessed December 27. 
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/automotive-and-assembly/our-insights/expanding-electric-vehicle-adoption-despite-early-growing-pains. 
2 The Boston Consulting Group. 2018. “The Future of Battery Production for Electric Vehicles”. Accessed December 27.  
https://www.bcg.com/publications/2018/future-battery-production-electric-vehicles.aspx. 
Chart I: 
Global EV sales 
(million units, 2018-2030F) 
Source: BCG (The Future of battery production for electric vehicles) 
Note: EV=electric vehicle; MHEV=mild electric vehicle; HEV= 
hybrid electric vehicle; PHEV= plug-in hybrid electric vehicle; BEV= 
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§ Internal combustion engine vehicle 
According to a study conducted by BCG2, 16% of 
an ICE vehicle’s manufacturing costs are 
attributable to the ICE powertrain, and the 
remaining 84% are unrelated to the powertrain 
(Chart IV). For this analysis, we considered that 
manufacturing costs encompass not only the 
materials but also labour, depreciation, and R&D.  
We isolated these costs from the income statement and attributed the ones related to sports and 
GT3 cars based on revenues. Dividing by the number of units shipped4, that we assume is the 
same as the units manufactured, we conclude that the cost of an ICE Ferrari is €141 thousand 
in 2018. This implies that the manufacturing costs account for 64.6% of the average car price 
of €218 thousand5 observed in 2018, a ratio that we assume will remain constant. 




§ Battery electric vehicle (BEV) 
As for the BEV, the same BCG study2 suggests that BEVs are up to 35% more expensive to 
manufacture than ICE vehicles and that 15% of the costs are attributable to the e-motor and 
power electronics, 35% to the battery pack and 50% are unrelated to the powertrain (Chart 
 
3 Grand tourism 
4 Sports and GT units shipped per year, from 2016 to 2018, respectively: 7373, 7894, 8881 






Costs unrelated to 
the powertrain











BEV versus ICE vehicle manufacturing 
costs breakdown 
 
Source: BCG (The Future of battery production for electric vehicles) 
Note: ICE= internal combustion engine; BEV= battery electric vehicle. The 
electric powertrain consists of the electric motor, power electronics and battery 
pack. 
Table I: 
Forecast of internal combustion engine manufacturing costs  
(2019E-2025F) 
 
Source: Nova Research Team 
(per car, € thousand) 2019E 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F
ICE powertrain 22            23            25            25           26            28            28            
Costs unrelated to powertrain 117          123          129          131         138          146          146          
Total ICE cost 139          147          154          156         164          174          174          
Weighted average car price 215          227          238          242         255          269          269          
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IV). Knowing this, we increased the manufacturing costs of the ICE vehicle by 35% and 
applied the breakdowns mentioned above to arrive at the individual component costs. We 
concluded that a Ferrari BEV would cost €190 thousand to manufacture, in 2018.  
§ Plug-in hybrid electric vehicle 
A PHEV is a combination of an ICE vehicle and a 
BEV (Figure I). In fact, besides the components 
found in ICE vehicles, a PHEV also has an electric 
motor, power electronics, a battery pack and a 
generator, all elements present in a BEV. Given the 
lack of literature on the cost breakdown of PHEVs, we took the projected costs of both an ICE 
vehicle and a BEV and combined the components that would be necessary for a PHEV6.  
To get to the manufacturing costs of the PHEV, some adjustments had to be made, considering 
that a PHEV has a much less powerful e-motor and a smaller battery than a pure electric 
vehicle. For example, the most potent Tesla model (Model S Performance) has a battery of 
100 kWh and an e-motor of 451 kW7 while the SF90 Stradale has a 7.9 kWh battery and 162 
kW e-motor8. Assuming that a Ferrari BEV would have the same specifications as the Tesla 
model mentioned above, we conclude that in 2018 a lithium battery would cost Ferrari 
€665/kWh and the e-motor €63/kW. Assuming the same ICE powertrain costs and costs 
unrelated to the powertrain from the ICE vehicle, we conclude that a Ferrari PHEV with the 
same battery capacity and e-motor as the SF90 Stradale should cost €156 thousand to 
manufacture, in 2018. However, costs change every year based on the specific PHEVs that 
Ferrari is offering and on the evolution of battery prices. According to research, battery prices 
 
6A similar methodology was applied by McKinsey & Company. 2019. “Making electric vehicles profitable”. Accessed December 27.  
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/automotive-and-assembly/our-insights/making-electric-vehicles-profitable. to achieve the manufacturing costs of a BEV 
departing from an ICE vehicle. 
7 Tesla. 2019. Accessed December 27. https://www.tesla.com/en_gb. 
8 Ferrari. 2019. Accessed December 27. https://www.ferrari.com/en-PT. 
Figure I: 
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decreased 13%9 in 2019 and are expected to decrease by 10.4%10 per year from 2020 to 2025. 
Implying that battery prices will decrease from €665/KWh in 2018 to €299/KWh in 2025. 
To forecast PHEV manufacturing costs from 2020 onwards (Table II), we took the ICE vehicle 
costs per year mentioned above and added the battery and e-motor costs based on our 
expectation of the subsequent models (Table III) and the proportions in which they will be 






V. EV production impact on margins and Conclusion 
Besides estimating the manufacturing costs of a single plug-in hybrid, it is interesting to 
understand how mass production will impact Ferrari’s margins. For each year from 2019 to 
2025, we took the expected units shipped from sports and GT cars11 and computed how many 
would be PHEVs and ICE vehicles based on the hybridization rates from the main report12. In 
2020, for example, 467 out of 9782 units shipped will be PHEVs. Knowing that an ICE vehicle 
 
9 Green Car Reports. 2019. “Electric car battery prices dropped 13% in 2019, will reach $100/kwh in 2023”. Accessed December 27. 
https://www.greencarreports.com/news/1126308_electric-car-battery-prices-dropped-13-in-2019-will-reach-100-kwh-in-2023. 
10 McKinsey & Company. 2019. “Making electric vehicles profitable”. Accessed December 27.  https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/automotive-and-
assembly/our-insights/making-electric-vehicles-profitable. 
11 Sports cars units shipped from 2019E to 2025F, respectively: 6176, 6561, 6969, 7404, 7865, 8355, 8875; GT cars units shipped (including Purosangue) from 
2019E to 2025F, respectively: 3088, 3221, 3422, 6737, 8605, 9142, 9712. 
12 Percentage of hybrid cars, in sports and GT range, from 2019E to 2025F, respectively: 0%, 5%, 18%, 27%, 52%, 83%, 83%. 
Table II: 
Forecast of plug-in hybrid vehicle manufacturing costs  
(2020F-2025F) 
ee 
Source: Nova Research Team 
(per car, € thousand) 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F
ICE powertrain 23            25            25            26            28            28            
Costs unrelated to powertrain 123          129          131          138          146          146          
Battery 4              4              5              4              4              3              
E-motor & power electronics 10            7              7              6              6              6              
Total PHEV cost 161          165          167          174          183          183          




SF90 Stradale 2020 2025 8            162       
SF90 Stradale Spider 2021 2025 8            162       
Sucessor 812 Superfast 2022 2027 9            140       
Sucessor of F8 Tributo 2023 2027 9            71         
Sucessor of F8 Tributo Spider 2024 2027 9            71         
GT
V6 2021 2024 9            71         
Sucessor of 1st V6 2024 2027 13          101       
Sucessor Portofino 2022 2025 9            71         
Purosangue 2022 2025 14          100       






Specifications of future PHEV models 
Source: Nova Research Team 
2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F
Quantity
Super Sport 14% 14% 11% 10% 10% 10%
Normal Sport 53% 53% 41% 38% 38% 38%
Super GT 11% 11% 9% 8% 8% 8%
Normal GT 22% 22% 17% 16% 16% 15%
Purosangue 0% 0% 22% 29% 29% 29%
Table IV: 
Hybrid models quantity breakdown 
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costs €147 thousand to manufacture and a PHEV costs €161 thousand, the manufacturing costs 
(labour, materials, depreciation and R&D) will total around €1.4 billion in 2020. Computing 
depreciation as 21.4% of prior year PP&E (which, in turn, is computed as 30% of revenues) 
and R&D as 15.4% of revenues, we can to isolate costs of sales (mainly materials and labour), 
which total €0.9 billion in 2020, for sports and GT cars.  
Bringing the remaining revenue streams to the analysis assuming that cost of sales represent 
41.2% of revenues, as observed in 201813, and all the remaining costs as in the main report, 







We conclude that Ferrari’s gross margin, EBITDA 
margin and EBIT margin (Chart V) will all deteriorate 
with the manufacturing of plug-in hybrids. This is 
consistent with the reality that we see in most car 
manufacturers that are having trouble reaching the 
breakeven in their EV sales. Nevertheless, as 
production levels increase and battery prices decrease, 
margins will improve, as we can already observe in the forecast the year 2025.   
 
13 With the exception of spare parts and servicing from sports and GT cars, that we assume will have the same margins as the corresponding cars. 
41.2% 42.7% 43.1%
44.6% 44.8% 45.2% 44.9%
33.6% 32.0% 31.6% 30.2% 30.0% 29.6% 29.9%
22.3%
18.5% 17.4% 17.8% 17.3% 16.1% 15.9%
2019E 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F
Gross margin EBITDA margin EBIT margin
Source: Nova Research Team 
Chart V: 
Gross margin, EBITDA margin and EBIT margin 
(2019E-2025F) 
Table V: 
Core-business income statement 
(2019E-2025F) 
Source: Nova Research Team 
Income statement (€ thousand) 2019E 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F
Revenue 3 671 611    4 040 252  4 227 936  5 063 949  5 961 135  6 569 637  6 951 586  
Cost of sales 1 512 062-    1 725 918-  1 823 531-  2 256 061-  2 672 691-  2 970 830-  3 122 373-  
SG&A 332 741-       366 149-     383 158-     458 922-     540 230-     595 376-     629 990-     
Other expenses, net 9 547-           9 547-         9 547-         9 547-         9 547-         9 547-         9 547-         
R&D 563 411-       619 980-     648 780-     777 067-     914 740-     1 008 116-  1 066 726-  
Provisions 21 627-         24 544-       25 886-       31 832-       37 608-       41 724-       43 853-       
Core EBITDA 1 232 222    1 294 114  1 337 034  1 530 519  1 786 318  1 944 045  2 079 097  
Depreciation & Amortization 412 971-       547 440-     602 335-     631 076-     754 201-     886 397-     976 839-     
Core EBIT 819 251       746 674     734 698     899 443     1 032 117  1 057 648  1 102 258  
